Conflict Resolution - Mali War - Intervention Strategy

Conflict Resolution Essay

Mali War – 2012 Rebellion

Intervention strategy to achieving ‘Warm Peace’

Introduction

Mali was once a symbol of democracy within West Africa[1], but due to ethnic tensions and exacerbated violence the country has succumbed to nine years of insecurity, displacement, and increasing deaths[2]. In January 2012, the MNLA (National movement for the Liberation of Azawad) fought against the Malian government for independence of Northern Mali (Azawad) due to a belief that the South had ‘abandoned’ them[3]. By March mutinous soldiers, many of which were low ranking, staged a coup d’état seizing governmental control[4]. Ansar Dine, an Islamic hardline group, originally supported the MNLA but the groups divided after they conflicted on matters such as the imposition of Sharia Law[5]. The MNLA began violently conflicting with Ansar Dine and Islamic extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram who subsequently occupied the Northern cities. Mali has since been consumed by ethnic violence in the form of genocidal intent, Islamic extremism, direct and cultural violence, and political corruption, causing major displacement and insecurity[6]. The initial tensions were caused by a combination of extremist groups presence, arbitrary borderlines, and climate change.

The extremist groups and the differing ethnic groups make up the ‘substrate actors’ within Mali[7]. The Northern regions of Mali are primarily made up of the Tuareg and Moor people. The central region homes groups such as the Dogon, Bozo, Songhay, and Fula (Fulani). The southern region, where political decision making takes place, contains Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke. Extremist groups have exacerbated tensions which has led to direct violence and cultural violence. For example, the Fulani’s killed 35 Dogon civilians based on an assumption that the Dogons had killed 160 Fulani villagers a week prior[8], even though an extremist splinter cell were the perpetrators. Direct violence has equated to 1,689 to 3,713 people killed between 2012 to 2014[9]. A large proportion of the deaths were soldiers, but many were civilians, with 456 killed in 2019[10].

The rising deaths prompted the ‘nation states’[11] France and the UK to deploy troops in 2013 and 2020 respectively to fight the ‘war on terror’ and protect civilians[12]. ‘Intergovernmental organizations’[13] such as the UN and the G5 (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) deployed peacekeepers and diplomats to engage with the governmental leaders and encourage ceasefires to achieve frozen peace[14]. Nation states and international organizations’ efforts have been comparatively unsuccessful on account of Mali’s geographical size, which caused troops to be spread sparse and inefficacious as a protective agent countering direct violence. Political leaders have been viewing the issues as a conflict that began in 2012, but this is highly erroneous and detrimental to the longevity of security in Mali. Eight rebellions have occurred since 1963, all of which have seen failed peace accords and unsustainable procedures due to a lack of cultural understanding and fallacious agendas which have perpetuated Mali as an insecure state[15].

Therefore, this essay will set forth recommendations for an immediate adjustment that will create a stable and equitable Malian society that is premedicated on governance reform. This will be conducted through ethnic group negotiation to break up the regions and create a federal system. Instructions shall be detailed for assuaging ethnic animosity towards one another and how key actors can provide international support[16]. There will be a brief discussion of an operational recovery system that encourages internal endorsement for the repatriation of ex-combatants and sustainable economic prosperity through renewable solar energy[17].

Main Body & Analysis

The Mali civil war is an internal conflict but there must be an acknowledgement of the role that Mali plays in the intrastate war occurring in the wider Sahel. As such, applications to peace that might apply to Mali may not be sufficient to bring peace to the entire region. Applying Ozerdem and Lee’s peace model, Mali is at the apex amidst ‘conflict resolution’[18]. Any advancement towards a ceasefire has been spoiled primarily because previous actions towards peace have been too particular to a specific group yet neglecting others. For example, the 2015 ‘accord’ focused on the 2012 rebellion whilst disregarding the extremist and ethnic groups, causing conflict to quickly resume[19]. All actors must be inclusively negotiated with to create opportunities for peace negotiations, permitting a higher probability of regional endorsement. For instance, ‘regional governance’, such as the case for the European Union, would create a polycentric and non-hierarchical relationship, making the state and substrate actors mutually dependent[20]. As such, this would establish a zero-sum environment, resulting in a higher perceived cost of violence.

Immediately reforming government can be key for initiating a secure and sustainable Mali within the ‘liberal peacebuilding process’[21]. The current state borders were arbitrarily imposed by imperial powers in 1885 that were not matched with pre-colonial socioeconomic divisions[22]. It may not be constructive to redraw the Sahel in entirety but restructuring Mali and its governance may negate some of the existing conflicts derived from the imposed borders. Transforming the political system from a one-party to a multi-party system can assist in preventing political corruption, but most importantly it can restore trust in the government. Governance reform should be conducted through a process of decentralization: a movement to a multi-state Mali whereby governance is carried out at the local level under a federal umbrella. This would shift from a bureaucratic top-down governance to cooperative local self-governments, allowing for higher levels of transparency and accountability[23]. A system resembling the US federal system will promote intergovernmental political competition, producing desirable outcomes for the state. Volden suggests that ‘with intergovernmental political competition, when one level of government is more efficient that another [level], the more efficient one will act as a sole provider’[24]. This means that progression can perpetuate if regression into conflict occurs and as such, can result in long-term stability through regional acts of succor rather than requiring international support.

Dividing Mali into regional states should be conducted via negotiations amongst the ethnic groups and governmental officials. This can be facilitated but not implemented by the UN or nation states because otherwise the social tension will not be mitigated in the long-term, and violence will return in the form of aggravated civil war. Ethnic leaders have communicated that they would be prepared to engage in peace negotiations for a decentralized Mali and so to repudiate the exigencies will prolong insecurity.

The assemblage of these leaders and any subsequent consultations will be a great challenge due to the strenuous tensions that exist but focusing on conflict transformation can militate the hostilities[25]. Current resolution patterns represented by the intergovernmental organizations in Mali do not reflect the cultural nuances and inequitable distribution of resources so cultural transformation can reform the relationship of domination and resistance (rebellion and civilian) to collaboration[26]. This was exemplified in Columbia through the ‘Peasant Farmer Association’ whereby favorable structural changes were implemented through information sharing which stabilized the peasant economy[27]. Relational transformation will not wholly alleviate societal issues but an establishment of equitable power between the ethnic groups will become an inclusive necessity, therefore increasing the probability of sustainable peace. The standard liberal peace process would determine conflict resolution to be followed by a recovery stage and then finally conflict transformation. However, due to the volatility within Mali, any acts of social stabilization within the recovery stage must occur as a consequence of social equity and bipartisan cooperation and therefore, recovery must follow conflict transformation.

A guiding principle of the UN is ‘independence, neutrality and impartiality’, and this must be reflected in all actions within the peace process[28] not just in the judgements and assistance provided by the UN but in geographical location of negotiations. Therefore, it may be prudent for the talks to be held away from Mali if the ethnic leaders are comfortable to do so. It would not suffice to decide a location without an agreed arrangement, as there needs to be mutual trust amongst all parties for any development towards warm peace.

The UN and nation states must ensure their aims provide sufficient opportunity for Mali to establish their own peace and conclusions otherwise there will be a higher risk of insecurity developing. Nation states’ military units should remain in post but only as a protective measure and educational tool for the civilians. For example, the British training of Afghan Security Forces soldiers in 2013 enabled a training academy to fight for peace without the requirement of British soldiers[29]. This allowed the civilians to defend themselves if necessary, alleviating a perceived requirement for military aid. External military training must be completed with widespread actions as current ad-hoc training whereby specific areas are targeted have inevitably failed. This is because the ‘enemy’ simply wait until the military have departed before reemerging, by which time those that have been trained cannot defend themselves effectively. For example, it can be argued that the 2012 Mali rebellion was inevitable due to US ad hoc military training programs which created factions[30]. Resources and equipment was provided disproportionately and as such the factions began to fight each other and inflicted direct violence on local villages.

The above instructions detail how Mali can transform its governance to a federal system in which the ethnic groups negotiate the future of their country without the imposition of foreign agents. Some discussion must be placed on the reintegration of ex-combatants as it is integral to returning Mali to a pre-conflict society whereby sustainable security is feasible. Nilsson contends that reintegration is a ‘societal process aiming at the economic, political and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society’[31]. The instructions set in this essay are essential in the immediacy, but the following suggestion may be completed in conjunction with or be implemented subsequently to governance reform if residual spoiler problems and timing issues occur.

Mali can update its agricultural industry using renewable solar energy to restrain the detrimental effects of climate change, create local economic value, prevent scarcity, and ease conflict. Mali is heavily reliant on agriculture as 34% of GDP comes from the industry[32], with only 10% of the population having regular access to electricity in 2010[33]. Financing is a key issue with establishing a renewable energy source, considering Mali as amongst the poorest nations in the world at 165th in relation to GDP per capita[34]. Therefore, it may be necessary to incentivize foreign investment through repatriation of funds, value added tax and reduced customs tax. Mali has made progress in this regard through the annual ‘ease of doing business report’ in which it was moved from 170th in 2016 to 110th in 2019. The International Labor Office suggest that insufficient jobs in the medium-term invalidates successful disarmament and demobilization strategies[35]. Worldwide, 11.5 million jobs were created through the renewable energy sector in 2020 and so Mali can utilize this to create a successful recovery program and reintegrate ex-combatants and general civilians as well as create a sustainable agriculture industry[36]. This will promote a level of trust and cooperation between the conflicting groups which will allow for diplomacy to overcome disputes rather than violence. Through implementing governance reform and renewable energy, Mali can continue establishing effective processes that will create a secure state in a turbulent region.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this essay aimed to set forth an immediate instruction plan for Mali to begin moving towards warm peace. It is not a comprehensive and complete list but rather a focused indication of the most urgent steps through governance reform and renewable energy. Transforming the Malian government to a decentralized federal system that will see regional control with the ethnic groups. This should be facilitated by both the nation states and intergovernmental organizations but only via a provision of assistance not imposition. The nation states can focus on extremist groups by protecting negotiations and civilians. Mali can simultaneously or subsequently reform its solar energy industry into a renewable energy source creating jobs and allowing for the repatriation of ex-combatants. To sustain peace in Mali, careful consideration to the ethnic groups is imperative otherwise spoiler problems can return the state to one of insecurity. Positive peace will not be completed in the short or medium term because of the depth of Malian tensions. Mali has the facilities to achieve peace and security in the long term provided foreign states do not attempt to impose their will on them. There are many steps and spoiler issues that Mali must navigate precariously but any sustainable progression towards peace brings with it amelioration to the citizens.

Bibliography

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-Bleck, Jaimie, and Kristin Michelitch. 2015. "The 2012 Crisis In Mali: Ongoing Empirical State Failure". African Affairs 114 (457): 1-3. doi:10.1093/afraf/adv038.

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 -International Labour Office. 2010. "Socio-Economic Reintegration Of Ex-Combatants - Guidelines". ILO Crisis Response And -Reconstruction Programme. Geneva: International Labour Office. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141276.pdf.

 -International Renewable Energy Agency. 2019. "Renewables Readiness Assessment Mali". IRENA. https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Sep/IRENA_RRA_Mali_2019_En.pdf.

 -IRENA. "Renewable Energy Jobs Continue Growth To 11 Million Worldwide". 2020. Irena.Org. https://www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2020/Sep/Renewable-Energy-Jobs-Continue-Growth-to-11-5-Million-Worldwide.

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[1] Lewis, David. 2012. "Analysis: Mali: From Democracy Poster Child To Broken State". Reuters: Emerging Markets. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-idUSBRE83N09Q20120424.

[2] Human Rights Watch. 2021. "Mali Conflict And Aftermath". Compendium Of Human Rights Watch Reporting 2012-2017. Human Rights Watch. Accessed April 12. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/malicompendium0217.pdf.

[3]TRAC. "National Movement For The Liberation Of Azawad (MNLA) | Terrorist Groups | TRAC". 2021. Trackingterrorism.Org. Accessed April 10. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/national-movement-liberation-azawad-mnla.

[4] Bleck, Jaimie, and Kristin Michelitch. 2015. "The 2012 Crisis In Mali: Ongoing Empirical State Failure". African Affairs 114 (457): 1-3. doi:10.1093/afraf/adv038.

[5] Mapping Militant Organizations. “Ansar Dine.” Stanford University. Last modified July 2018. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ansar-dine

[6] Thomas-Johnson, Amanda. 2019. "Massacre In Mali: How The 'War On Terror' Fuels Tribal Violence In The Sahel". Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/massacre-mali-how-war-terror-fuels-tribal-violence-sahel.

[7] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 33-36

[8] Sarai, Esha. 2019. "Ethnic Conflicts In Mali Exacerbated By Extremist Presence". Voice Of America. https://www.voanews.com/africa/ethnic-conflicts-mali-exacerbated-extremist-presence.

[9] Project Ploughshares. "Mali (2012 – First Combat Deaths) - Project Ploughshares". 2021. Project Ploughshares. Accessed April 12. https://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/mali-2012-first-combat-deaths/#Deaths.

[10] Human Rights Watch. “How Much More Blood Must Be Spilled?”". 2020. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/02/11/how-much-more-blood-must-be-spilled/atrocities-against-civilians-central-mali.

[11] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 33-36

[12] Wallace, Ben. 2020. "UK And France Able To Deploy A 10,000 Strong Joint Military Force In Response To Shared Threats". GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-able-to-deploy-a-10000-strong-joint-military-force-in-response-to-shared-threats.

[13] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 33-36

[14] UN News. "Mali: ‘G5’ Countries Need Support Fighting Terrorism In Sahel Region". 2021. Africa Renewal. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/sahel/news/mali-%E2%80%98g5%E2%80%99-countries-need-support-fighting-terrorism-sahel-region.

[15] Shurkin, Michael Robert, and Stéphanie Pézard. 2015. Achieving Peace In Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, And The Prospects For A Durable Settlement. RAND Corporation.

[16] Al Jazeera. "Ethnic Groups In Central Mali Sign ‘Three Peace Agreements’". 2021. Aljazeera.Com.

[17] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 31-33

[18] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 82-86

[19] Devermont, Judd, and Marielle Harris. 2020. "Why Mali Needs A New Peace Deal". Csis.Org. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-mali-needs-new-peace-deal.

[20] Krahmann, Elke. 2003. "National, Regional, And Global Governance: One Phenomenon Or Many?". Global Governance: A Review Of Multilateralism And International Organizations 9 (3): 323-330. doi:10.1163/19426720-00903006.

[21] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 40-43

[22] Kisangani, Emizet F. "THE TUAREGS' REBELLIONS IN MALI AND NIGER AND THE U.S. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR." International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 1 (2012): 59-97. Accessed April 19, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23266590.

[23] Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2021. "Decentralisation And Governance". Suntory And Toyota International Centre For Economic And Related Disciplines. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Accessed April 12. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6821109.pdf.

[24] Volden, Craig. 2005. "Intergovernmental Political Competition In American Federalism". American Journal Of Political Science 49 (2): 327-340. doi:10.1.1.204.7960.

[25] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 82-84

[26] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 86-87

[27] Ozerdem, Alpaslan, and Sung Yong Lee. 2016. International Peacebuilding: An Introduction. New York: Routledge. 92-94

[28] United Nations. 2021. "A Staff Members Guide To Resolving Disputes". Administration Of Justice At The United Nations. United Nations. Accessed April 14. https://www.un.org/en/internaljustice/assets/pdf/StaffMembersGuideToResolvingDisputes.pdf.

[29] Knuckley, James. 2021. "Op Toral: What Are British Troops Doing In Afghanistan?". Forces Network. https://www.forces.net/news/five-years-what-are-british-troops-doing-afghanistan.

[30] Karlin, Mara. 2017. "Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint". Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint/.

[31] Nillson, Anders. 2005. "Reintegrating Ex-Combatants In Post Conflict Societies". Reintegrating Ex-Combatants - Sida. Sweden: The Swedish International Development Agency. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:106715/FULLTEXT01.pdf.

[32] International Renewable Energy Agency. 2019. "Renewables Readiness Assessment Mali". IRENA. https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Sep/IRENA_RRA_Mali_2019_En.pdf.

[33] Republic of Mali Ministry of Energy and Water Resources National Department of Energy. 2021. "Achievements, Challenges And Opportunities Executive Summary". Renewable Energy Mali, Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program In Low Income Countries. Ministry of Energy and Water Resources. Accessed April 20. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/RE%20Mali%20exec%20summary%20final.pdf.

[34] "GDP Per Capita - Worldometer". 2021. Worldometers.Info. https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-per-capita/.

[35] International Labour Office. 2010. "Socio-Economic Reintegration Of Ex-Combatants - Guidelines". ILO Crisis Response And Reconstruction Programme. Geneva: International Labour Office. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_141276.pdf.

[36] "Renewable Energy Jobs Continue Growth To 11 Million Worldwide". 2020. Irena.Org. https://www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2020/Sep/Renewable-Energy-Jobs-Continue-Growth-to-11-5-Million-Worldwide.